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WWII-ETO-Operation Overlord

OPERATION FORTITUDE OVERLORD DECEPTION & BEYOND

A Working Bibliography of MHI Sources

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The objective of Operation FORTITUDE was to deceive German intelligence into concluding that the Allies would cross at Pas-de- Calais instead of Normandy. Major activities under this cover operation included deceptive aerial bombardment, false information fed to known enemy agents, and the concentration of dummy installations and landing craft in southeastern England nearest Calais. Misleading radio traffic also played a major role in the overall deception by "relocating" actual units and creating non- existent ones. As a result, German intelligence consistently overestimated the number of division in England and counted 42, nearly double the actual number.

GENERAL SOURCES

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Bickell, Craig. "Operation FORTITUDE SOUTH: An Analysis of Its Influence Upon German Dispositions and Conduct of Operations in 1944." War & Society (May 2000): pp. 91-121. Per.

Bond, John. "The Ghost Army (FUSAG)." Trading Post (Jan/Mar)1976: pp. 47-48. Per.

Cave Brown, Anthony. Bodyguard of Lies. NY: Harper & Row, 1975. 947 p. D810S7C36.
See esp pp. 461, 474, 603-04, 684-87 & 734-38.

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Cruickshank, Charles. Deception in World War II. NY: Oxford, 1979. pp. 170-189 & 235-36. D744C77.

Delmer, Sefton. The Counterfeit Spy. NY: Harper & Row, 1971. 256 p. D810S8C3584.
Personal account of double agent "Cato"; see esp Chaps 9 & 13.

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Photocopy of galley proof(?) with handwritten remarks. Prepared 1945-1948 and set for publication by British War Office in 1976. 260 p. D7565N6F67.

The author, an involved staff officer, may be Cuthbert Hesketh(?).

Hesketh, Roger. Fortitude: The D-Day Deception Campaign. NY: Overlook, 2000. 513 p. D756.5N6H47.

Kneece, Jack. Ghost Army of World War II. Gretna, LA: Pelican, 2001. 280 p. #2113.23HST.2001.

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Selected SHAEF docs from NARA.

Newark, Tim. "Deception at D-Day." Military Illustrated (Jun 2004): pp. 8-12 & 14-15. Per.

Norman, Albert. Operation Overlord: Design and Reality. Harrisburg, PA: Mil Serv Pub, 1952. 230 p. D7565N6N6.
See Chap 8.

Perrault, Gilles. The Secret of D-Day. Boston: Little, Brown, 1965. 249 p. D7565N6P4.
See Chap 23.

Pogue, Forrest C. The Supreme Command. In USAWWII series. Wash, DC: OCMH, 1954. pp. 180-183. D769A533v2pt4.

Ricklefs, Richard G. "Fortitude South: D-Day Deception." Military Intelligence (Apr/Jun 1996): pp. 48-50. Per.

Wilmot, Chester. The Struggle for Europe. NY: Harper, 1952. pp. 199-210 & 332-333. D743W532.

See also:

-Bibliographies on Intelligence in World War II in Intelligence; 23d HQ Special Troops" in Deception; and the main Overlord bibliography.

FICTICIOUS US UNITS IN ENGLAND:

First Army Group (FUSAG)	21st Abn Div
Fourteenth Army	22d Inf Div
V Armored Corps	23d Arm Div
XXXI Corps	46th Inf Div
XXXIII Corps	48th Inf Div
6th Abn Div	50th Inf Div
9th Abn Div	55th Inf Div
17th Arm Div	135th Abn Div
18th Abn Div	145st Inf Div
	157th Inf Div

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Rosignoli, Guido. Army Badges and Insignia Since 1945: Book One. NY: Macmillan, 1975. 218 p. UC530R68v1.
See Plates 35 & 44.

Smith, Richard W. Shoulder Sleeve Insignia of the U.S. Armed Forces, 1941-1945. Bloomfield, NJ: Portrayal, 1981. pp. 1, 6, 21, 68-69 & 112. UC533S65.

AFTER D-DAY...

Opn FORTITUDE succeeded in diverting main German attention away from Normandy. It continued to function after D-Day, with the objective of convincing the Germans that the Normandy landings constituted a massive diversion for the main invasion yet to come via Pas de Calais.

Additional fictitious units may not have been created on the European continent before the breakout from Normandy, since the purpose of FORTITUDE was to maintain the fiction of a concentration of forces in England for the later invasion. German intelligence apparently did not identify any fictional US divisions in France. See:

Praun, Albert. "German Radio Intelligence." Abridged copy. USAREUR Foreign Military Study n.d. 239 p. D739F6713noP-038.Abr.

See especially pp. 73-86 and 120-123.

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